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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

asserting a Dole claim before a judge who has not yet declared his
position - and they are an overwhelming majority1 6 4 - a claimant
will be best advised to file a claim against the State within 6 months
of the date of negligence. Such a course of action would, in all
instances, preserve the tortfeasor's claim for apportionment.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 20.20(2)(b): Criminal jurisdiction over out-of-state conduct
threatening New York's community welfare withheld.
Section 20.20(2) of the CPL permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain types of criminal conduct having a
deleterious effect in New York although the criminal acts themselves have been performed in another state. 1 65 Departing from the
traditional territorial theory of jurisdiction,' 6 6 the statute is based
upon the concept of "the injured forum.' 6 7 As the name implies,
x1"Out of the 17 judges in the Court of Claims, only Judges Blinder, Delorio, Lengyel
and Quigley have declared their positions.
165CPL § 20.20(2) provides state criminal courts with jurisdiction to convict a person of
an offense:
Even though none of the conduct constituting such offense may have occurred
within this state [if]:
(a) The offense committed was a result offense and the result occurred within this
state. If the offense was one of homicide, it is presumed that the result, namely the
death of the victim, occurred within the state if the victim's body or a part thereof
was found herein; or
(b) The statute defining the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a
particular effect in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed
was performed with intent that it would have such effect herein; or
(c) The offense committed was an attempt to commit a crime within this state; or
(d) The offense committed was conspiracy to commit a crime within this state and
an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurred within this state ....
16 Under the common law territorial theory of jurisdiction, a sovereign state has
jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its borders. See Ludwig, Improving New York's
New Criminal Procedure Law, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 387, 396-400 (1971).
167 For a discussion of the injured forum theory of jurisdiction, see id. at 397-98. The
injured forum concept appears to be an offshoot of the territorial theory and has been
termed "objective territorial jurisdiction." United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113,
115 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Jurisdiction based on the concept of the injured f rum can be traced
through the leading case of Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911), wherein defendant was
indicted in Michigan for bribery and the use of false pretenses to defraud that State. In spite
of the fact that the alleged criminal acts occurred entirely in Illinois, the State of Michigan
was deemed to have jurisdiction, since "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of
the harm .... " Id. at 285 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The federal courts have
recognized the "objective territorial jurisdiction" theory in the prosecution of crimes committed in a foreign jurisdiction that have resulted in harmful effects in the United States.
See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974) (prosecution in United States
for uttering stolen American checks in Mexico); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (jurisdiction asserted over conspiracy conducted abroad
which resulted in successful smuggling of drugs into United States); cf. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F.
Supp. 1167, 1174 (D.N.J. 1975); Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F.
Supp. 594, 600 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd mem., 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 927 (1958).
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the latter jurisdictional base confers the right to prosecute upon the
community which has been harmed by the criminal conduct irrespective of where such conduct occurs.
Three of the four "injured forum" paragraphs of section
20.20(2) are relatively clear. An out-of-state principal or accessory
to a crime or criminal conduct is subject to New York jurisdiction if
the crime is a "result offense" and the injury ensuing from the
criminal conduct occurs here;1 68 if the conduct amounts to an
attempt to commit a crime in New York; 69 or if an overt act in
170
furtherance of an out-of-state conspiracy occurs in this State.
The import and application of the remaining subdivision, section
20.20(2)(b), however, is less readily apparent. Subsection (2)(b)
grants New York courts jurisdiction over an offense notwithstanding the fact that none of the proscribed conduct occurred within
this State provided that "[t]he statute defining the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a particular effect in this state
and the conduct constituting the offense committed was performed
with intent that it would have such effect herein.' ' 7 1 While this
language on its face appears to be a broad grant of jurisdiction, it
must be read in conjunction with section 20.10(4), which requires
Prior to the enactment of CPL § 20.20, extraterritorial application of New York's
criminal law was generally avoided. See People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925)
(New York had no jurisdiction over in-state conspiracy to commit larceny in another country
unless conspiratorial conduct constituted an attempt in New York); People v. International
Nickel Co., 218 N.Y. 644, 112 N.E. 1068 (1916) (mem.),aff'g 168 App. Div. 245, 153 N.Y.S.
295 (2d Dep't 1915) (New York lacked jurisdiction over New Jersey factory producing smoke
which created noxious odors in Richmond County); Wilson v. Commissioners of Parole Div.,
123 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953) (New York parole warrant could not prevent
defendant from obtaining bail in another state); People v. Hess, 207 Misc. 520, 141 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Schuyler County Ct.), aff'd, 286 App. Div. 617, 146 N.Y.S.2d 210 (3d Dep't 1955) (New
York resident could not be convicted in New York of bigamy which occurred in another
state).
168 CPL § 20.20(2)(a). See TEMPORARY COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND
CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 10.20(2)(d), Staff Com-

ment at 41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Staff Comment], which posits that New York would
have jurisdiction over a "homicide case in which the victim is shot in Florida and later dies of
the wound in New York." See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945).
6
9See CPL § 20.20(2)(c). Staff Comment, supra note 168, § 10.20(3)(b), at 46, which indicates that New York would have jurisdiction over "F, a Florida resident who, with intent to
kill N, a New York resident, mails a packaged bomb in Florida addressed to N in New York"
which is intercepted before it reaches New York.
170 CPL § 20.20(2)(d). See Staff Comment, supra note 168, § 10.20(3)(c), at 42, which
offers the example of "A, B, and C who conspire in Florida to kill N in New York and by
pre-arrangement they mail a packaged bomb to their co-conspirator D in New Jersey for the
purpose of having him plant it in N's New York home, but the package ... never reaches
D." Although the draftsmen indicate that A, B, C and D all would be subject to New York
jurisdiction, CPL § 20.20(2)(d) clearly indicates that some overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy must take place in New York before jurisdiction could be asserted.
171 CPL § 20.20(2)(b).
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that a "particular effect" must "have a materially harmful impact
upon the governmental processes or the community welfare of a
72
particularjurisdiction.'1
The extent to which CPL Section 20.20(2)(b) provides jurisdiction when, in fact, no harm has actually occurred in New York and
the relevant criminal conduct does not amount to an attempt to
commit a crime in this State, was the question confronting the
Supreme Court, New York County, in People v. Puig.173 After
summarily upholding that portion of the indictment which charged
defendant with conspiracy "'to sell and distribute cocaine in the
City of New York and elsewhere,' "14 the Puig court focused on
four counts based on an alleged transfer of cocaine near Newark
Airport in the State of New Jersey. 7 5 No resale of the cocaine in
the State of New York was established in the grand jury proceeding.176
Noting that this was a question of first impression, the court
ruled that section 20.20(2)(b) did not confer jurisdiction, and thus
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the four relevant counts of
the indictment. 7 7 While conceding that the alleged New Jersey sale
could have harmed the community welfare of New York by placing
the drug "in the stream of illicit commerce,"'17 8 the court emphasized the significance of the term "particular jurisdiction" in the
definition of "particular effect.' 79 This limiting provision, said the
court, renders section 20.20(2)(b) inapplicable to conduct which is
intended to injure the general community welfare of any New
York political subdivision. Rather, it is limited to offenses producing "palpably harmful consequences which are of necessity local
and peculiarly injurious to the rights of this state or its citizens."' 80
172 CPL

§ 20.10(4) (emphasis added).
Misc. 2d 228, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
at 233, 235-36, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 933, 936.
17'The indictment charged "defendant [with] sale of a controlled substance, possession
with intent to sell, straight possession and criminal facilitation .
Id. at 231, 378 N.Y.S.2d
I...
at 932.
7 6
Id at 232, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
1771& at 231-35, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 933-36.
8
1' Id. at 233, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 938-34.
179See text accompanying note 172 supra.
11085 Misc. 2d at 235, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 935. Judge Coon noted that although the thrust
of CPL § 20.20(2)(b) is severely limited with respect to interstate conduct, its "community
welfare" language is appreciably more expansive with regard to purely intrastate transactions. Id. See CPL § 20.40. Thus, in People v. Brill, 82 Misc. 2d 865, 370 N.Y.S.2d 820
(Nassau County Ct. 1975), a case involving the sale of pornographic material in New York
City with intent to resell in Nassau County, the Nassau County Court found that it had
jurisdiction pursuant to § 20.40 despite the fact that the proscribed conduct took place
outside the county.
173 85
174 Id.
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Examples of such offenses, according to the court, include attempts
to impugn the integrity of the State governmental or judicial processes or to commit fraud upon New York institutions.' 8 1
Clearly, Puig offered an opportunity for a broad expansion of
New York's power to prosecute criminal conduct which would
ultimately have an injurious effect on the people of this State.
Unfortunately, the constitutionally mandated concept of state
sovereignty bars prosecution of most crimes where the criminal acts
occurred on another side of a geopolitical boundary. Although a
contrary decision here might have signaled a major step in the
effort to curtail interstate trafficking in illegal narcotics, in declining the opportunity Judge Coon appears to have reached the only
result possible under the circumstances.
The court's stated fears that a contrary result would have
infringed on due process guarantees, rights against double jeopardy, and the sovereign authority of other states 82 were well
founded. It is obvious that the defendant could not be prosecuted
for the same crime in both New York and New Jersey. 183 Since all
,81 85 Misc. 2d at 235, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 935. The draftsmen of the New York statute
noted that it would:
[deal] with cases which are prosecutable in New York despite the lack of any
conduct or physical occurrence herein, [and] is somewhat more delicate and controversial than the other categories.
The kinds of offenses contemplated by [the] paragraph are exemplified by bribery and perjury, the "effects" of which are confined to corruption of New York's
governmental and judicial processes. Under this paragraph, New York would have
jurisdiction of, for example, a bribery offense based upon a bribe payment in
Florida to a New York judge for a future favorable decision in a pending New York
action.
Staff Comment, supra note 168, § 10.20(3)(a), at 41.
Various commentators have considered the effects of CPL § 20.20(2)(b). None, however,
have mentioned any conduct to which the statute is applicable other than the two examples
listed in the Staff Comment, i.e., bribery and perjury. See R. PITLER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL
PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL § 1.8, at 15-16 (1972); H. ROTHBLATT, CRIMINAL LAW OF NEW
YORK § 35, at 22-23 (1971); 1 M. WAXNER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE § 1.2(2), at 1-27 to

-29 (1973).
"82 85 Misc. 2d at 234, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 934; cf. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
183 The fifth amendment provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " This has been held not to bar
successive prosecutions by the federal and state governments when each prosecutes separate
offenses arising from the same nucleus of operative facts. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959). Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), applied the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states. As Justice
Douglas noted in Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303, 1307 (1975), Benton may cast doubts
upon the Bartkus holding.
New York prosecutions for crimes previously punished in another jurisdiction were
specifically prohibited in the old Penal Law. Ch. 88, § 33, [1909] N.Y. Consol. Laws 2538.
CPL § 40.20(1) now simply provides that "[a] person may not be twice prosecuted for the
same offense." In the practice commentary to § 40.20 Professor Denzer states that the
general New York position on the separate sovereign theory is unclear. 1lA McKINNEY'S
CPL § 40.20, commentary at 106 (1971). There have been cases in which a separate
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the acts alleged in Puig occurred in New Jersey, that state has
primary jurisdiction over the offense. Absent a "particular effect"
in New York, this State could not properly deny New Jersey its
authority to prosecute by assuming extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The Puig holding appears to be in harmony with the legislative
intent underlying CPL section 20.20(2)(b). The only apparent purpose of the provision is to protect New York from offenses which,
although committed without the state, have the effect of corrupting
this state's governmental processes. 84 Nothing in the legislative
history supports an expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
beyond such offenses. Under the Puig holding, therefore, out-ofstate criminal conduct cannot generally be prosecuted in New York
absent an in-state act in furtherance thereof. The constitutional
obstacles to any contrary result are simply too substantial to overcome.
CPL § 60.35: Affirmative damage requiredfor impeachment of one's own
witness.
When the legislature enacted section 60.35 of the CPL18 5 it
drastically changed the method for impeaching one's own witness
prosecution by the state after a federal conviction or acquittal was barred when the crimes
charged were too similar. In Cirillo v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., 43 App. Div. 2d 4, 349
N.Y.S.2d 129 (2d Dep't 1973), a New York prosecution for possession of heroin was
dismissed where there had been a prior federal indictment charging the defendant with an
attempt to distribute heroin. The court did, however, approve the State's indictment against
the defendant for possession of cocaine on the same date. See People v. LoCicero, 17 App.
Div. 2d 31, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1962), modified, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 200 N.E.2d 622, 251
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1964) (state prosecution barred after federal acquittal on substantially identical charges).
In general, however, New York courts have adopted the state-federal exception to the
double jeopardy rule. See People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d
230, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 8 (1959) (state law against wiretapping punishes different conduct
than does federal law); accord, Klein v. Murtagh, 44 App. Div. 2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d
Dep't 1974); People v. Adamchesky, 184 Misc. 769, 55 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1945). In
determining whether a sister-state prosecution bars subsequent indictment in New York,
courts consider the nature of the relationship between the offenses prosecuted. See generally
7B McKINNEY's CPL § 40.20, commentary at 105 (1971). In People ex rel. Heflin v. Silberglitt, 2 App. Div. 2d 767, 153 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1956), the defendant had stolen a
car in New York, driven it in Massachusetts, and was convicted there for operating a stolen
vehicle. He then returned to New York and pleaded guilty to petit larceny. Later, however,
he brought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the New York indictment, containing
counts for the taking, removing, operating, and driving of the car in New York, subjected
him to double jeopardy. The court held there was no violation of his rights because the two
indictments involved different crimes, each of which was prosecuted in the state where it had
been1 committed.
4
S See note 181 supra.

1s" Section 60.35 of the CPL provides:
1. When, upon examination by the party who called him, a witness in a criminal
proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the case which tends to disprove the position of such party, such party may introduce evidence that such

